UK Unveils its “New Approach to Africa,” a partnership pitch that will meet hard tests
UK Minister for Latin America, Baroness Jenny Chapman's launch of the UK’s “new Approach to Africa,” delivered in London to African Ambassadors and High Commissioners, UK parliamentarians, and Africa policy shapers from civil society and the private sector, is written as a reset and a pitch at the same time. It argues the UK’s previous posture toward African states was “overdue” for change because it reflected the past, an “era of aid programmes” and “Western-driven blueprints,” rather than the future realities shaping both continents, such as AI, renewables, illegal migration, and great power competition.
What makes the speech worth parsing is not only the headline promise of partnership, but the way it tries to close a credibility gap that has haunted many “Africa strategies” across Western capitals. Chapman acknowledges that it is easy to use the language of partnership without practicing it, doing things “for” Africa rather than “with” Africa, and falling into one-size-fits-all assumptions that underplay the continent’s diversity, including diversity within countries. Her shorthand comparisons, Kampala vs Cape Town, Addis vs Accra, Nairobi vs N’Djamena, and even Darlington vs Durham, are meant to signal cultural humility and a break from the habit of treating “Africa” as a single policy file.
The listening exercise as a legitimacy strategy
The speech’s first major building block is process. Chapman describes a five-month listening exercise launched by Lord Collins, drawing input from over 600 organizations across governments, civil society, diaspora communities, businesses, and universities. The “resounding common message,” she says, was a desire for respectful, long-term relationships that deliver measurable change in people’s lives.
Politically, this is more than courtesy. It is an attempt to inoculate the strategy against the usual critique that London writes frameworks, then tours the continent selling them. Chapman explicitly rejects the idea of “cooking up” a reframed relationship in London and pretending it was co-created, arguing the UK needed to “ask rather than tell.” The risk is that listening can become branding if the next steps feel predetermined, or if delivery is judged by announcements rather than outcomes. The speech repeatedly anticipates that skepticism, especially at the end, when she calls the launch “the easy bit” and stresses that making it count is the real test.
“We are not donors,” the pivot from aid to investment
Chapman frames the modernization as consistent with the UK’s “modernised approach to international development,” insisting the UK is “not donors” but “partners, investors, and, most of all, reformers,” and that the approach should deliver for British and African citizens alike. That phrasing is doing heavy work. It aims to shed paternalism, but it also foregrounds UK self-interest, which she says must be stated clearly and upfront. In today’s climate, strategies that pretend to be altruism-only often sound dishonest, while strategies that admit interest risk sounding transactional. Chapman tries to split the difference by anchoring “shared interests” across seven principles.
The seven principles, and what they really signal
1) From donor to investor, trade as the centerpiece.
Chapman puts growth at the heart of the partnership, illustrated with a set of country examples: a UK-Kenya push to double trade in key sectors by 2030, now crossing £2 billion; an Enhanced Trade and Investment Partnership with Nigeria; an agreement with Morocco to support infrastructure ahead of the 2030 World Cup; and a “deep growth partnership” with South Africa reaffirmed by the UK prime minister in Johannesburg last month.
She ties this to support for the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA), and to UK tools like the Developing Countries Trading Scheme and Economic Partnership Agreements. She also highlights UK investment vehicles, British International Investment, FSD Africa Investments, and UK Export Finance, along with support for local capital markets, mobilizing private capital, and scaling African enterprises.
The strongest line here is her insistence that the goal is “building wealth, and not dependency,” reinforced by the UK’s partnership with the African Development Bank and today’s co-hosting, with Ghana, of the 17th replenishment of the African Development Fund. She also flags a Private Capital Mobilisation Day co-hosted with the AfDB on Wednesday, bringing together DFIs, export credit agencies, African governments, and investors to scale private capital for African priorities.
Analytically, this is the most coherent section of the strategy, because it names mechanisms, institutions, and leverage points. It also exposes the main vulnerability: “investor” language can read like a promise of capital, but investment flows depend on risk, returns, currency stability, and regulatory clarity. If the UK is serious about being an investor-partner, it will be judged on whether it accepts some of the political and financial risk that private capital often refuses to take.
2) Migration, framed as shared enforcement and shared optics.
Chapman says migration should be “fair, managed, and it must be controlled,” then pivots to illegal migration as the spoiler, funding organized criminal gangs and putting lives at risk. The offer is cooperation on the “drivers” of illegal migration, stronger border security, humanitarian support, protection for displaced people in regions of origin, disruption of criminal networks, and “facilitate returns.” She adds a hard edge: the UK will be “unapologetic” in pressing for high ambition and clear progress.
She also acknowledges a practical friction point, UK visas can seem hard to navigate, and says the UK is engaging African businesses to improve understanding and uptake of the Global Partner Programme, so people can travel to build ties and stimulate investment.
This principle is where partnership language usually breaks under pressure, because migration is domestic politics first in many donor states, and “returns” is the kind of phrase that can quickly become a litmus test. The speech tries to balance firmness with facilitation, enforcement with business mobility, but the balance will be judged by what happens at the visa counter and at the border.
3) Climate, nature, and clean energy, with “Mission 300” as the flagship.
Chapman argues Africa has the lowest levels of modern energy access despite abundant resources, and that it contributes least to emissions while shouldering some of the greatest climate risks, which she says is unjust and undermines growth and security.
Her commitments include further investment in renewables, biodiversity protection, sustainable agriculture and food systems, and ensuring climate finance reaches those who need it most. She names Mission 300, an initiative to connect 300 million people to electricity by 2030, and links it to creating opportunities via higher-quality carbon markets. She also references protecting the Congo Basin’s forest carbon stores through UK-African scientific collaboration and mobilizing finance via the Belém Call to Action. She looks ahead to African climate leadership as Ethiopia hosts COP32 in 2027.
This section has an internal tension that will matter in implementation: the speech wants faster growth and expanded energy access, while also emphasizing nature protection and clean transitions. That is the right direction, but it only works if the UK is willing to support the difficult enabling pieces, grid reform, guarantees, blended finance, and long-term maintenance capacity, not just project announcements.
4) Peace and security, led by African institutions, with Sudan centered.
Chapman calls peace and security the foundation of prosperity and “the most important thing we can do.” She commits to work with the African Union and partners to support African efforts to “silence the guns” and post-conflict recovery. The urgent focus is Sudan: pushing parties toward a ceasefire, delivering lifesaving humanitarian aid, and calling out, preventing, and averting atrocities, including in El Fasher, where she says rape has been used systematically as a weapon of war. She cites the scale of vulnerability: more than 12 million women and girls at risk in what the UN’s humanitarian chief has called the epicentre of human suffering. She says the UK is determined to support Sudan and ensure the world does not forget the conflict.
Beyond Sudan, she cites peacebuilding in the Great Lakes region and locally owned conflict prevention with Nigeria, Ethiopia, and Somalia, alongside commitments to international humanitarian law, freedom of religion or belief, and tackling violence against women and girls.
This principle is ambitious, but it is also where rhetoric is easiest and leverage is hardest. The UK can convene, fund, sanction, and advocate, but outcomes depend on local and regional power dynamics, and on whether partners perceive UK engagement as consistent, not episodic.
5) Strengthening systems for people and growth, with health and human capital as the engine.
Chapman contrasts piecemeal funding with whole-systems improvement: health and nutrition, education, and social protection, plus investments in vaccine manufacturing, disease prevention, and sexual and reproductive health and rights.
She cites the UK’s pledge of £850 million to the Global Fund, announced last month in South Africa, saying it can save over one million lives, prevent 20 million cases of HIV/AIDS, TB, and malaria, and deliver over £10 billion in economic returns. She extends the “systems” idea to financial self-reliance, offering UK expertise in tax, finance, and technology. She flags that the foreign secretary will host an Illicit Finance Summit in London next year to tackle criminal and corrupt wealth with a coalition of governments, multilaterals, and private sector actors.
This is a classic development move that can be genuinely transformative if it is patient and locally anchored. It also invites a clear metric question: which systems will be prioritized, in which countries, and how will success be measured beyond pledges.
6) Championing African voices in global decision-making, with debt reform as the headline.
Chapman argues for amplifying African calls for fairer representation in global forums, then points to debt pressure as a systemic crisis: 800 million Africans live in countries where public spending on debt interest exceeds spending on health.
She cites UK support for a third seat for Sub-Saharan Africa on the IMF board, calls for more voting power for lower-income countries at the World Bank, and welcomes a borrowers’ platform following agreement at the Financing for Development Conference in Sevilla earlier this year. She links this to the UK’s upcoming G20 Presidency in 2027, promising work on reforms to the debt architecture so African countries have a greater stake in decisions affecting them.
This principle is strategically smart because it engages the rules of the game, not just projects. It is also politically difficult, because debt architecture reform hits creditor interests, and meaningful voting-power changes are slow. If the UK wants credibility here, it will need to show what it can move within its own alliances.
7) Innovation and cultural partnerships, with AI diplomacy and soft power as connective tissue.
Chapman frames innovation broadly, AI and digital skills alongside music, sport, and design, arguing the ties are not only economic but human. She cites the first UK-South Africa AI Policy Training Programme launched at South Africa’s Science Forum in November, creating a cohort of AI-savvy diplomats and officials, supported by UK and South African universities. She promises “Soft Power collaboration” supporting alumni networks, maintaining scholarships, and strengthening research and education partnerships because African partners value them.
Chapman’s closing promise is that this is a “new kind of partnership,” with African leadership at the center, inclusive and respectful, resilient enough to work through disagreements. She commits UK ministers to travel and champion the principles on the continent, with high commissions and embassies responsible for embedding them. She says the approach will carry into the UK’s G20 Presidency in 2027.
If this “Approach to Africa” is meant to stand apart from past blueprints, it will be judged less by its principles and more by its behavior under stress: whether the UK takes African agency seriously when interests diverge, whether investment commitments absorb real risk, whether visa systems become easier for legitimate business and academic travel, whether debt reform advocacy survives pushback, and whether partnership remains partnership when headlines turn.