Coast Guard flags Venezuela as destabilizing risk, St. Maarten detection, intelligence work to deepen

GREAT BAY--The Coast Guard for the Kingdom of the Netherlands in the Caribbean has outlined its 2026 operational priorities in a year plan that frames the regional environment as volatile, with Venezuela’s ongoing crisis and transnational organized crime shaping how assets, intelligence, and partnerships will be used across the Kingdom’s waters. The plan is produced through coordination among the four countries of the Kingdom and is adopted at Kingdom level, setting the framework for what the Coast Guard will prioritize in the year ahead.

Venezuela is presented as a persistent risk factor because of prolonged political, social, and economic instability, and the plan notes that the Caribbean part of the Kingdom continues to feel its effects, particularly on the ABC islands. It describes Venezuela as unpredictable due to weak democratic and rule-of-law conditions, and warns that further deterioration could translate into increased migration flows and cross-border crime.

The plan also points to an explicitly strained political relationship between Venezuela and the Kingdom, tied in part to the Kingdom’s non-recognition of Nicolás Maduro’s claimed victory in the 2024 presidential election. Against that backdrop, it cautions that rising tensions between the United States and Venezuela in the Caribbean could influence the security situation and geopolitical dynamics around the Leeward islands, a factor the Coast Guard says it will monitor closely in relation to its tasks and deployments.

Beyond migration, the document links Venezuela directly to specific crime pressures that show up at sea. It states that the illegal trade and transport of firearms and ammunition remains a serious concern in the region, and that some weapons and ammunition are smuggled by sea from Venezuela and Colombia. It further notes that people attempting to enter the islands illegally by sea may also carry firearms, and it connects illegal gun use to the wider drugs problem.

The plan’s broader border narrative also reflects shifting routes and origins. In the section on combating human smuggling, trafficking, and irregular immigration, it notes that migration pressure is not only associated with Venezuela, and that irregular arrivals are increasingly also coming from Africa, underlining why information sharing across the chain is treated as a prerequisite for successful action.

Even with political strain, the plan describes certain practical cooperation as still functioning in limited areas. It states that the Coast Guard can, when necessary, cooperate with Venezuela on search and rescue (SAR) under a 1997 MoU, and notes that despite Venezuela’s internal situation, working-level relations in that SAR context remain functional.

St. Maarten: stronger “eyes” on the sea border and more intelligence-led operations

For St. Maarten, one of the most concrete elements in the year plan is the ongoing buildout of maritime border awareness. The Coast Guard reports that, using funding from the mutual arrangement to strengthen border control in St. Maarten, it has purchased and installed three mobile shore-based detection stations on the island since September 2019. The plan describes these systems as an interim boost, providing a local improvement in situational awareness around St. Maarten while a permanent, fixed shore-detection system for the Windward islands is developed in cooperation with Defense.

The plan ties that detection capability to a wider operational concept: intelligence-led policing in the maritime domain (maritiem IGP). It states that shore-based radar detection, along with sensors on Coast Guard vessels and aircraft, feeds into an integrated information picture that is presented through the Maritime Operations Center (MOC) in Curaçao.

St. Maarten’s role also shows up in the Coast Guard’s stated direction of travel for 2026, which is to push further into information-led operations, including building capacity in its information organization and training personnel to proactively collect and use intelligence to steer deployments. The plan says the Coast Guard will continue internal “IGP roadshows” and information sessions to deepen understanding of the concept across the organization.

On the community-facing side, the year plan indicates that the Coast Guard intends to intensify “community policing” in 2026, with the aim of strengthening information exchange with users of the maritime domain such as fishermen and marina operators, and building trust relationships that can support enforcement and safety outcomes.

What changes operationally around St. Maarten’s waters

The year plan also outlines tools and assets that matter for day-to-day operations in St. Maarten’s surrounding waters. It describes the Coast Guard’s fleet of light vessels, including Metal Shark interceptors used for patrols and targeted interdictions, and Justice-20 craft used very close to shore and in inner waters. It states that the Justice-20 vessels are scheduled to be replaced starting in 2026, part of broader modernization.

On the investigative side, the plan notes that a “pilot opsporing” model, in which Coast Guard personnel participate in multidisciplinary investigative teams with chain partners, was implemented in 2025 on St. Maarten after earlier use in Curaçao. The Coast Guard signals it wants to extend that approach to Aruba in 2026, presenting the model as a practical way to strengthen maritime intelligence and enforcement outcomes through closer operational integration.

The plan also references St. Maarten’s place in the wider information architecture, noting Coast Guard participation in information fusion centers, including an Information Center on St. Maarten, and stating that expanded staffing in the information organization should enable more structural participation in inter-island information coordination.

Regionally, the document further notes that units from the St. Maarten support point, along with other Coast Guard assets, patrol frequently in the waters around St. Eustatius and Saba, and seek collaboration with chain partners where possible, a reminder that St. Maarten’s operational footprint often extends beyond its immediate coastline into the broader Windward area.

The year plan effectively links Venezuela’s instability to the Coast Guard’s operational posture: heightened uncertainty can drive irregular migration and cross-border crime pressures, which in turn increases the importance of early detection, a strong information position, and coordinated enforcement across partners. For St. Maarten, the emphasis on shore-based detection, intelligence-led operations, and deeper integration with the justice chain points to an approach aimed at tightening maritime border control with better data, faster cueing of assets, and more targeted operations rather than purely routine patrol patterns.

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